based on scrutiny of all parliamentary debates on every remedial response to a section 4 declaration, on the floor of each House, in Committees, at Report and 'Ping Pong' (consideration of amendments) stages, and in consideration of the relevant scrutiny reports of the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) on each remedial response. 5 Thus, while the period is too brief for sweeping generalisations about the definitive constitutional role of section 4 declarations, the completeness of the record allows some interesting insights to emerge. The general picture is of a remedial regime that differs in important ways from some other weak and strong form systems of constitutional judicial review. The parliamentary record displays an attitude that has been predominantly accepting of and collaborative with the courts' role, though also minimalist in some responses and on the whole manifesting delays by the Government that have no principled defence. Lastly, it appears that there is, indeed, evidence of an emerging constitutional convention of response by the Government and Parliament to section 4 declarations of incompatibility.
I. The Landscape of Section 4 Declarations of Incompatibility

A. The Types of Legislative and Government Response
The Government may respond to a declaration of incompatibility in various ways.
First, it legally can choose to do nothing at all. Where this has occurred, however, it was because Parliament had already amended the offending legislation prior to the declaration (as noted in Figure 8 .1 below). On the other hand, despite some lengthy delays and the possible exception of prisoner voting (as discussed further below), there has been no case to date where the Government or Parliament affirmatively chose not to remedy incompatible legislation. Second, the Government can ask Parliament to repeal the offending provision by way of an Act of Parliament. In doing so, it can either introduce an act among whose central purposes is the intention to address the incompatibility (which I will call 'whole act responses') or it can add a provision to an existing bill that may be related to the issue, but that primarily 5 I have not examined any remedial responses to findings of rights violations by the European Court of Human Rights. concerns other matters (which I will call 'tacking responses'). Third and finally, the Government can amend and replace the offending provision by way of a remedial order under section 10 of the HRA. This section empowers a minister to use subordinate legislation (an executive order) to amend the act to remove the incompatibility. As specified in Schedule 2 to the HRA, the remedial order must be laid before Parliament for an affirmative resolution, either before it comes into force or, in urgent cases where it is necessary to give it immediate effect, by way of affirmative resolution after it has come into force. The remedial orders are also subject to scrutiny by the JCHR, which has also given guidance in relation to when the use of remedial orders is appropriate. 6 Indeed, the JCHR's role in the parliamentary process is absolutely crucial, though it is explained in detail elsewhere in this volume. The broader landscape of the response to declarations of incompatibility under the HRA is set out in . See also Guidance to Departments at back of this Report. 7 Please consult the methodological appendix at the end of this chapter for information on all other figures in this chapter.
The chart in Figure 8 .1 discloses an unmistakable preference for acting through the ordinary legislative procedure. This may explain some of the delays I will shortly detail. I return to this issue below.
B. Promptness of Response
One of the most important differences between the HRA and some foreign systems is the fact that the Government is capable of delaying its response to a section 4 declaration by a considerable amount of time. Only political pressure-usually from the JCHR and civil society-can accelerate the response. As Figure 8 .2 shows, the delay between the court judgment and the remedial provision coming into force is fairly substantial. Young of the passage of the remedial legislation through Parliament, which demonstrates that the process was exemplary of dialogue working rather than of stubborn foot-dragging. 
C. General Impact on the Legislative Process
We can consider the question of impact by looking at the number of judgments and extent of the impact of such judgments. As to the first, data compiled for this study
shows that the number of statutes declared unconstitutional or subject to declarations of incompatibility is rather low in international comparison with Canada, France or Germany.
[Insert Figure 4 around here -comparative strike down rates]. 
Blood and Tarbuck
Amendment to scheme to allow deceased father's name to be added to a child's birth certificate.
Moderate
Morris and Gabaj
Challenged scheme for fighting 'benefits tourism' required local authorities assessing priority need for homelessness assistance to disregard nonnationals who required leave to remain in the country. New scheme extended rights to British, EU and certain Commonwealth citizens to be given an offer of accommodation (no more) in the private rented sector for a duration of one year. 
II. Do Declarations of Incompatibility Promote Greater
Democratic Deliberation?
There has been a significant amount written about the idea of constitutional judicial review as 'democratic dialogue' between courts and legislatures, notably in Canada, More broadly, it is not a widely shared tenet in modern constitutionalism that only legislatures can speak with the authority of a democratic institution. If our view of a contemporary democracy comprises not only respect for rights, but also the practice of rights-based constitutional review, then judicial review can itself claim a non-legislative variety of democratic pedigree. 42 On that view, which is also held by some prominent deliberative democrats, the question is whether the practice does 40 considered the point at all or that the act was adopted at a time when the concept of rights was substantially different from that which the society has presently legally embraced through its constitution or ratification of international instruments. [Insert Table 2 here: please ensure all on one page]. The Government decided to introduce new legislation rather than prolong the incompatible scheme, which was due to expire within three months of the judgment.
As is well known, the Bill's proposed invasions of personal liberty were profound, 52 and so the first question asked by David Davis MP, the Shadow Home Secretary (Conservative), was: 'What is the immediate emergency that demands that draconian powers against British subjects be rushed through these Houses of Parliament without proper consideration, scrutiny or debate?' 53 Davis suggested that the Lords' judgment, which he agreed with and supported, 54 was being used opportunistically to ram through an invasive piece of post-9/11 legislation in short order. The JCHR also protested loudly and clearly:
[T]here can be no justification for including such wide and unprecedented powers of executive detention in legislation which is being rushed through Parliament at a speed which prevents proper scrutiny, in order to be on the statute book in time to deal with 48 . Such a debate on first reading is exceptional in the legislative process, and ostensibly was due to the high profile of the judgment and the Government's decision to characterise the situation as exceptionally urgent. 52 The Bill introduced a new scheme of 'control orders', which applied to British nationals as well as foreigners and allowed, among other things, pervasive control of the lives of the controlees through a combination of house arrest, electronic tagging, mobility restrictions and control on communications. The orders, furthermore, could be imposed as a civil measure without the controlee ever seeing the evidence in support of the orders or even being able to communicate with the special advocate who represented him after the advocate had seen closed evidence. 53 with the type of response, and specifically whether it is a whole act, remedial order or tacking response. House can not only be formed but also fed into the subsequent amendments at committee stage before executive views become ossified. Another is that tacking amendments are often inserted into extremely important and wide-ranging bills that will affect millions of people. 57 MPs and peers are thus likely to face issue exhaustion, and compatibility issues will be subordinated to the more important battles. Furthermore, tacking responses tend to get introduced late in the legislative process and sometimes quite late in the day (or evening), compounding issue exhaustion with physical exhaustion.
The debates concerning remedial order responses, on the other hand, are focused precisely on the rights issue, and the dossier available to parliamentarians will make the JCHR reports central to the issue before them, 58 and the JCHR has been no less vigilant in its review of proposed remedial orders (as well as of the use of the remedial order procedure). The possible flaw with them, however, is that since they are executive orders approved by resolution rather than primary legislation, they may enjoy an even lower profile in Parliament than have some of the other amendments.
For instance, the debate in the Lords concerning the remedial order following the Thompson case (concerning the rights of sex offenders to request their removal from the Sex Offenders Register) reads very well in Hansard. It is focused, careful and engaged with material points raised in the JCHR report. What Hansard did not report, however, was that there were fewer than 10 peers in the room during the debate and more than one was evidently not paying attention to the discussion. 59 Indeed, a debate an hour earlier on a motion regarding the welfare and transportation of horses in the EU was much more lively and well attended. Even so, the JCHR has urged the Government to make more frequent use of remedial orders to 'remedy incompatibilities more swiftly'. 60 And were one asked to rank the quality of deliberation and scrutiny in types of parliamentary responses, the clear order appears to be whole acts, followed by remedial orders, followed by tacking responses.
III. A Constitutional Convention of Response?
Albert Venn Dicey considered that the conventions of the constitution 'consist of maxims or practices which, though they regulate the ordinary conduct of the Crown, 58 Remedial orders followed R(H), Baiai and Thompson, the details for which are available in the Ministry of Justice's Responding to Human Rights Judgments (2012, Cm 8432) Annex A. 59 These are based on the author's observations from the gallery during the debate, which is reported in HL Deb 5 July 2012, vol 436, cols 876ff. There are (remarkably) no official attendance records. 60 Joint Committee on Human Rights (n 6) para 22.
of Ministers, and of other persons under the constitution, are not in strictness laws at all'. 61 The hallmark of a constitutional convention in this tradition is that it is regarded as constitutionally binding, but not legally binding. Some authors, Aileen Kavanagh prominent among them, have speculated there may be an emerging constitutional convention in favour of legislative amendment following a section 4 declaration. 62 This section presents evidence that supports that view, though it is not conclusive.
In an influential 63 analysis, Ivor Jennings identified three key questions in any inquiry about the existence of a constitutional convention: 'First, what are the precedents; secondly, did the actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by a rule; and thirdly, is there a reason for the rule?' 64 Starting with the first of these for our present subject, the precedents suggest an almost uniform practice of legislative amendment by way of response. The arguable exception has been the Smith v Scott decision on prisoners' rights to vote (which accepts and applies the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Hirst), yet there too, as discussed above, a response is awaited. 65 At any rate, this one instance of either extreme delay or noncompliance is not conclusive. Some commentators do not believe that complete uniformity of action is required to establish a constitutional convention, 66 and in international law it is not necessary that a practice manifest 'absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule' in order to determine the existence of legally binding international custom. 67 And, as previously noted, the distinctive aspect of that case is that anger has been directed at Strasbourg rather than at UK courts, the latter tending (with some variation) to agree with the Government that the issue is a matter for Parliament. Mr. Clarke: I do not accept any of that. I simply do not accept the argument. I do not think that it is correct. What I do think is that when the Law Lords of this country make a set of criticisms about the way that we are operating that is well founded, by a vote of eight to one, it is incumbent on the Government-and, I would argue, on Parliament-to respond to that and decide how to deal with it.
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In an earlier part of the debate, as well, Mr I support the Home Secretary's views on the merits of the existing sex offenders register and her concern about the Court's decision, but will she confirm that under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 there is absolutely no obligation on her or the House to change the law one bit? All the Court did was to issue a declaration of incompatibility and section 4 makes it absolutely clear that any decision following that is a matter for the sovereign Parliament. It would be entirely lawful for the House and her to say that the existing regime will continue without any amendment.
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This statement flatly contradicts the idea of a constitutional convention, from a senior parliamentarian. By way of reply, the Home Secretary noted his statement, but continued with her overarching message that 'we are appalled by the decision … but we do have to make a change. We will do so in the most minimal way possible'. We clearly believe that it was a correct judgment and, as the Government, we comply with Supreme Court judgments … We do not believe that a public review is neededthe ruling was quite clear and unequivocal, and we have responded.
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The language of compliance here, also found in other relevant portions of Hansard, implies the existence of an obligation. Furthermore, when the remedial order was introduced in the Lords a month later by Baroness Stowell of Beeston, a Conservative peer, she stated the following:
Our constitutional arrangements are such that when the highest court of the land identifies an incompatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights, the Government of the day, whoever is in power, take remedial action. This is for various reasons, not the least of which is to ensure that the Government are not left vulnerable to further legal proceedings, potentially involving millions of pounds of taxpayers' money … The Government were disappointed with the UK Supreme Court's ruling, but we take our responsibility to uphold the law seriously, and that includes human rights law. 
Conclusion
The HRA is a key constitutional statute in the UK and has created a new and exciting period in law and politics. This chapter has explored the feature of that system that is most novel in comparative perspective, namely, the ability to declare primary legislation incompatible with human rights without legally affecting its validity or continuing operation. I sought to elaborate upon some of the distinctive aspects of the UK system, drawing a sometimes sharper contrast between it and foreign systems than is sometimes noticed.
A set of such contrasts was examined in the discussion of the distinctiveness of the HRA. I found there that delay, when combined with the absence of retroactive relief, damages or restitution, interim relief and the constitutional infirmity of the HRA itself, amounted to significant differences between the HRA and other systems, including that of Canada. In the subsequent section, I concluded that the declaratory nature of the power under the HRA did not appear to prompt courts to be any more assertive in their findings of non-compliance with the Convention. By international comparison, they tend rather to be on the cautious side in terms of numbers of declarations issued and also with the intrusiveness of the individual judgments they have given. The portrait suggests a non-activist judiciary, though nothing there supports the view that they have not done their job under the HRA. These are not akin to statistics regarding convictions for rape, where the numbers alone give cause to shudder. I believe that the test of a civilised society is its approach to minorities and the respect that we have for their rights. Transsexual people face obstacles and legal problems on a day-to-day basis, quite unnecessarily. They have human rights that need defending, and freedoms that deserve respect. The Bill will right a wrong that currently exists, and I commend it to the House.
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The vote that followed immediately was 336 in favour, with 26 against. While there is important room for improvement, the record tends on the whole to demonstrate in no small way the virtues of a parliament that takes rights seriously, working for the most part in constitutional harmony with its colleagues on the bench.
